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COMMENT
LEGAL CONTROLS ON NEIGHBORHOOD
DEFENSE ORGANIZATIONS
INTRODUCTION
Sharply rising urban crime rates 1 and a perception that traditional
police protection no longer affords adequate security for property or
person 2 have precipitated increasing citizen participation in the law
enforcement process. Citizens have reverted to the tradition of self-
help to protect their individual and community interests. The result
has been visible in the rise of the neighborhood defense organization
and other voluntary community groups attempting to solve the prob-
lem of neighborhood crime.' Working both within and outside insti-
tutional law enforcement channels, these groups have highlighted the
problems involved in citizen participation in an area traditionally re-
garded as falling within the bounds of a state monopoly. Further, they
have presented problems as to the nature and extent of permissible
governmental regulation of their activities.
This Comment will examine possible governmental control mech-
anisms, both statutory and otherwise, within the parameters of three
archetypal organizations: first, the "Watch," a group of approximately
sixty Philadelphia residents; second, "Creating a Healthier Atmos-
phere in Newark" (CHAIN), a group of black residents of that city;
and third, the "North Ward Citizens Committee" (NWCC), a group
of white Newark citizens under the leadership of Anthony Imperiale.
All three groups were observed in their day-to-day operations.4
I. THE GROUPS
A. The Watch
The Watch was formed in 1968 in response to a series of criminal
assaults in a Philadelphia neighborhood. The group's activities con-
sisted of maintaining a series of listening posts in the homes of certain
I See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1972, at 1, cols. 5-7; id., Jan. 27, 1972, at 41,
cols. 1-4.
2 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1972, at 41, cols. 1-2; id., Jan. 13, 1972, at 33,
cols. 1-5.
3 See N.Y. Times, May 25, 1972, at 56, cols. 1-6 (city ed.).
4 These three neighborhood defense organizations were observed during a study
undertaken in the summer of 1970 by two second year students at the University of
Pennsylvania Law School. Guidance, encouragement, and funding were generously
provided by the Center for the Study of Criminology and Criminal Law and its
Director, Dr. Marvin Wolfgang. Many of the factual data used throughout this
Comment were obtained through direct contact and discussion with members of
neighborhood defense groups, police officials, and community leaders.
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of the members, chosen for their strategic locations within the neighbor-
hood. These stations were connected by an intercommunication system
and were manned during hours of expected criminal activity.
Whenever an incident or suspicious person was observed by a
member, the police were immediately notified. Although police officials
refused to recognize the group openly, they were well aware of the
Watch's activities and were willing to dispatch patrol cars when the
Watch requested police assistance.5
B. CHAIN
The second group, CHAIN, engaged in foot and vehicular patrols
in the predominantly black Central Ward of Newark.' The group was
formed in 1968 when a police strike left the ghetto neighborhood
virtually unprotected. Many residents banded together to form an
ad hoc protective committee. After the strike ended, the residents
decided to formally organize on a continuing basis.' During the course
of their nightly patrols," criminal incidents were reported by radio to
CHAIN headquarters and would then be relayed to the police. Some-
times, however, members directly intervened to prevent a crime or
detain a criminal until the police arrived.9 Members used their own
automobiles for patrolling, but were provided with uniforms and equip-
ment by civil defense authorities. As a condition of this material
assistance, civil defense officials required each member of CHAIN to
undergo thirty-six hours of training over a six week period and re-
quired that the organization abide by the rules and regulations ap-
plicable to Civil Defense Auxiliary Police."° After the initial training,
however, only minimal continuing supervision was exercised by regular
police and civil defense officials. Group leadership was provided by the
citizens who had originally organized CHAIN during the police strike
of 1968.
CHAIN is somewhat unusual because it involved residents of a
ghetto neighborhood in a program of positive crime control. Residents
of such areas often look upon the regular police as a hostile, occupying
force. CHAIN sought to change this attitude toward the police al-
though the leader of CHAIN admitted this was a difficult objective and
G Interview with Chief Inspector Harold Fox, Director of Police-Community
Relations, Philadelphia Police Department, in Philadelphia, June 29, 1970.
6 Interviews with Courtney Weekes, primary citizen organizer and director of
CHAIN, in Newark, July 11, 1970; Lieutenant Otis Barnes, Community Relations
Officer for Newark Police, Central Ward, in Newark, July 20, 1970; Lieutenant
James Murray, Newark Police Officer in Charge, Civil Defense Auxiliary Police,
in Newark, July 21, 1970.
7 Weekes Interview, supra note 6.
8 The patrolmen concentrated on private business and public buildings in the area.
The author was permitted to accompany a regular CHAIN patrol through the
Central Ward on July 11, 1970.
9 Weekes Interview, supra note 6.
10 Murray Interview, supra note 6. For further discussion of the Civil Defense
Auxiliary Police, see text accompanying notes 200-02 infra.
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that previous efforts had been largely futile. However, the community
regarded CHAIN members favorably and often were willing to place
great trust in the citizen patrolmen whom they referred to as "jive
cops." " Evidence of this relationship was CHAIN's successful quell-
ing of disturbances in the Central Ward following the assassination of
the Reverend Martin Luther King. 2 CHAIN also interested com-
munity residents, especially CHAIN's members, in traditional law
enforcement; a substantial percentage of CHAIN members left the
citizen organization to join the regular police.13
C. NWCC
The third group, the North Ward Citizens Committee, also op-
erated foot and vehicular patrols in Newark, but, unlike CHAIN, was
not recognized or assisted by city or state officials. 4 During the
summer of 1967, the residents of the predominantly white North Ward
organized the group, primarily in response to urban unrest during the
same year. The NWCC emphasized vehicular patrols dispatched at
regular intervals throughout the neighborhood. 5 NWCC headquarters
monitored the police radio band and communicated this information,
together with calls from individual citizens, to NWCC patrols. Patrols
were conducted with members' automobiles and operating expenses
were defrayed through members' dues and contributions from non-
members.' 6
NWCC patrolmen received instruction in unarmed combat and
practiced with firearms at a local rifle range." This aspect of the
organization has received considerable attention from the media,', and
NWCC's leader, Anthony Imperiale, is often pictured surrounded by
his collection of firearms or dressed in a judo uniform.
Despite indications that such displays may have been made largely
for public relations effect, the group has posed a serious problem for
the regular police. There is some indication that extra-legal punish-
31 Weekes Interview, supra note 6.
121d.
13 Id.





18 See, e.g., Cope, In New Jersey He's Mr. White Vigilante, TRUE, May 1969,
at 33; Goldberger, Tony Imperiale Stands Vigilant for Law and Order, N.Y. TMEs,
Sept. 29, 1968, §7 (Magazine), at 30; Mangel, 40-Gun Tony Imperiale: A Violent
Man Rises in Newark, LooK, Sept. 9, 1969, at 67; It Politics, It's the New Populism,
NEwswEEK, Oct. 6, 1969, at 60.
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ment has been imposed upon apprehended suspects.1 9  Further,
Imperiale has made statements having overtones of racial animosity. °
II. LEGAL CONTROLS ON CITIZEN DEFENSE ORGANIZATIONS:
POSSIBLE LIMITATIONS
Private assistance of law enforcement agencies has deep historical
roots 21 and may offer several public policy gains.2 2 The question of
whether group assistance is constitutionally protected, however, has not
yet received careful consideration. Analysis might usefully begin with
an examination of the common law and statutory rights and duties of
citizens individually to supplement police law enforcement activities.
A. Private Rights and Duties
The law of citizen's arrest is bottomed on traditional common law
rules.2 3 Several of these rules, the details of which vary considerably
among jurisdictions, have been embodied in state statutes. 24  In most
jurisdictions, a private citizen may not arrest an individual unless he
knows with certainty that a felony has been committed and reasonably
believes that the individual committed it.25 Presumably, neighborhood
defense groups may employ the citizen's arrest to the same extent as an
individual. Because of the requirements of certainty and a reasonable
belief, however, the group member may find that the common law right
of arrest does not allow him to patrol, investigate, and take preventive
action.
19 Interview with state government official who asked to remain anonymous, in
Trenton, July 17, 1970. The official stated that informers had been assigned to
infiltrate the NWCC. It was his belief that the organization sometimes employed
extra-legal sanctions.
20
Guns aren't meant for people . . . . But they're necessary today. Anyone
who thinks they're going . . . to take the law into their own hands and come
into Newark will find Anthony Imperiale and his men waiting. And we'll
be waiting with guns .... We're willing to fight and go to jail to preserve
the peace. If it comes to all-out war, and we have to kill some of the black
and white animals, we'll kill 'em.
Mangel, 40-Gim Tony Imperiale: A Violent Man Rises in Newark, LOOK, Sept. 9,
1969, at 67.
2 1 See, e.g., F. BAUM & J. BAUM, LAw OF SELF-DEFENSE 49-52 (1970) (describ-
ing vigilante committees in American history).
2 2 See TASK FORCE ON THE POLICE, THE PRESIDENT'S CommIssIoN ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JusTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE
221-28 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT]; THE PRESIDENT'S COM-
MISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE
OF CRIME IN A FREE SocIETy 288-89 (1966).
23 See Statute of Winchester, 13 Edw. 1, chs. 1(4), VI(14); T. PLUCKNEI,
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAw 430 (5th ed. 1956).
24 See generally Wilgus, Arrest Without A Warrant (pts. 1-3), 22 MICH. L.
REv. 541, 673, 798 (1924); Note, The Law of Citizenes Arrest, 65 CoLUM. L. REv.
502 (1965) ; MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07 (4) (Proposed Off. Draft 1962).
25 See, e.g., People v. Martin, 225 Cal. App. 2d 125, 36 Cal. Rptr. 924 (1964);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 629.37(1) (1947) ; N.Y. CODE ClUM. PROC. § 183(1) (1958).
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The common law further gives the individual the privilege of
self-defense.26  He may use reasonable force to prevent harm to himself
even if the application of such permissible force results in death or
serious bodily injury to the aggressor." Jurisdictions differ as to
whether the individual must exhaust all avenues of retreat before he
meets a threat to his life with deadly force.28  Even where no retreat
requirement is included, however, it is doubtful that the common law
right of self-defense would apply to one who arms himself and then
places himself in a position where he is likely to be attacked. 29  This is,
of course, the position of neighborhood defense groups that conduct
aggressive, armed patrols. Where they injure those who attack them,
members of these groups possibly may not be allowed to rely on self-
defense principles because their posture and conduct invited the attack.
Members of citizen defense groups may rely on other rights, how-
ever, when they are conducting various other activities. For example,
citizens have a constitutional right to communicate information in-
volving a violation of federal law to a federal officer." This right has
been buttressed by a congressional enactment creating a federal sub-
stantive offense for interfering with the communication of such in-
formation to federal officers."' As one court has recently pointed out,
26 See Perkins, Self-Defense Reexamined, 1 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 133 (1954);
W. PRossER, LAw OF TORTS § 19 (1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 64,
66, 68 (1964).
27 Beale, Homicide in Self-Defense, 3 CoLum. L. REv. 526 (1903) ; Brown v.
United States, 256 U.S. 335 (1921) ; Beard v. United States, 158 U.S. 550, 559
(1895).
28 Compare State v. Bell, 38 Del. 328, 192 A. 553 (1937), with People v.
Zuckerman, 56 Cal. App. 2d 366, 132 P.2d 545 (1942).
29 Clearly one has the right to arm oneself without necessarily forfeiting his
right of self-defense. E.g., State v. Schroeder, 103 Kan. 770, 176 P. 659 (1918).
On the other hand, an armed citizen on defense patrol is "not seeking to avoid
danger or to do everything in his power to avert the necessity of shooting . . ..
Id. at 772, 176 P. at 660. Most cases deny the right of self-defense to one who
provokes a quarrel. See, e.g., Hayes v. Wainwright, 302 F. Supp. 716 (N.D. Fla.
1969). Whether an armed, or unarmed, patrol can ever constitute provocation is
unclear. The patrolling individual probably realizes at least that he is susceptible to
attack. This might not be enough for criminal liability, however. Professor Perkins
has written:
Arming oneself to be ready to defend against an expected murderous attack
is one thing. Taking along a weapon to be used if an unlawful blow should
be countered with deadly force is quite another. He who has killed his
adversary in an encounter entered into under these circumstances, is guilty
of manslaughter, if not murder. Under other circumstances the development
of the contest into deadly proportions may have been so clearly probable that
this is one of the most important factors in the case. But one who has struck
an unlawful blow with no intention or expectation of inflicting more than an
ordinary battery should not be held criminally accountable for a homicide
he is forced to commit to save his own life, no reasonable retreat being
available, unless from the start this necessity was plainly forseeable as a
likely consequence.
Perkins, supra note 26, at 160; cf. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 558 (1967) ("We
do not agree with the Court of Appeals that [the defendants] somehow consented to
the arrest because of their anticipation that they would be illegally arrested . ... ).
30 In re Quarles & Butler, 158 U.S. 532 (1894) ; see Roviaro v. United States,
353 U.S. 53, 59 (1957) ; United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70, 80 (1951).
3118 U.S.C. §510 (1970).
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regulation of this right by a state would impinge on activity protected
by the first amendment.
3 2
B. Rights of Association
In NAACP v. Alabama,33 the Supreme Court declared void a
state court order requiring the National Association for the Advance-
ment of Colored People (NAACP) to divulge membership lists in
compliance with the foreign corporation law of Alabama. The Court
relied on a right to associate which the fourteenth amendment due
process clause protected against state action:
It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for
the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect
of the "liberty" assured by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.34
NAACP v. Alabama makes clear that state action curtailing
either association or certain group activities may be constitutionally
impermissible, at least where the state is unable to show a "compelling"
interest.35  In most cases constitutional protection for group activities
appears to turn on whether the group is exercising first amendment
rights.3" NAACP v. Alabama involved state action interfering with
freedom of association "for the advancement of beliefs and ideas." 37 In
NAACP v. Button,"8 Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, cited
lobbying of legislatures and union organizational efforts as examples
of "orderly group activity" protected by the first and fourteenth
amendments.3" Arguably defense groups are petitioning the govern-
ment for redress of grievances, specifically the failure of the police to
provide adequate protection. That the Court would view many forms
of activity as petitioning the government was the implication of
NAACP v. Button where litigation was held to be protected group
activity.4° But the purpose of the defense organizations is more often
to take action themselves rather than to rely on requests to the city or
state governments. Once it goes beyond mere discussion or advocacy
32 Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 690 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016
(1968).
33357 U.S. 449 (1958).
34 Id. at 460.
35 Id. at 463.
36 "This Court has repeatedly held that rights of association are within the
ambit of constitutional protections afforded by the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments." Gibson v. Florida Legislative Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 543 (1963); see
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
37357 U.S. at 460.




958 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
and engages in an active patrol program, a group's conduct may be
subject to any regulation that is "reasonable." 41
If the nature of the group activity were the only test to determine
when state regulation must serve a compelling state interest, determin-
ing the scope of federally protected neighborhood defense organization
activity would be relatively simple. Absent a compelling state interest,
the three model defense groups would have an absolute right to exist
free of state interference and exercise any first amendment freedom.
Their efforts to enforce the laws themselves, on the other hand, would
be subject to any "rational" state regulation. In a series of decisions
involving the Ku Klux Klan," the Communist Party,43 groups ad-
vocating anarchy or syndicalism,4" and groups essentially military in
character,45 however, the Supreme Court has upheld state legislation
not directed at particular activities but prohibiting or discouraging
group membership itself. Grounds for decision have been the nature
of the group including its internal organization, general purpose, and
principal activities.
In New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman,4" for example, a case
decided thirty years prior to NAACP v. Alabama, the Court upheld a
New York law requiring disclosure of documents and membership lists
for unincorporated associations demanding an oath as a condition of
membership.47  The Klan had argued that the disclosure requirements
discouraged Klan members in the exercise of their freedom of asso-
ciation and therefore violated the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. The Court accepted the disclosure requirements on the
basis of the lower court's finding that an oath-bound association had a
"manifest tendency . . . to make the secrecy surrounding its purposes
and membership a cloak for acts and conduct inimical to personal rights
and public welfare . .. 48
In Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board,
49
the Court upheld a provision of a federal statute requiring "Communist-
41 Government regulation of conduct has been upheld when: it is within the
scope of constitutional power; it furthers a substantial governmental interest unrelated
to the suppression of free expression; any restriction on free speech or other first
amendment liberties incidental to the regulation is no greater than that essential to
the furtherance of the public interest. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367
(1968).
4 2 New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63 (1928).
43 E.g., Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1
(1961) ; Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
44 E.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) ; Gitlow v. New York, 268
U.S. 652 (1925).
45 Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
46 278 U.S. 63 (1928).
47 Id. at 66. The law exempted only associations with fewer than 20 members,
labor unions, and benevolent orders. Id.
4 8 Id. at 75.
49 367 U.S. 1 (1961).
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action organizations" to disclose their membership lists.5" Again the
Court gave great weight to findings concerning the nature and purpose
of the group. Congress had found that members of the Communist
movement were "rigidly and ruthlessly disciplined," " that the move-
ment was subject to foreign domination,52 and had the purpose of
overthrowing the government of the United States and establishing a
totalitarian dictatorship. 3
Bryant and Communist Party dealt with the power of the state and
federal governments to regulate and require disclosure; other cases
have dealt with governmental power to entirely proscribe particular
organizations. In Presser v. Illinois,4 the Court held that a state could
totally proscribe an organization that could be characterized as a
"military company." "
In Presser, a member of the "Lehr und Wehr Verein" society,
dedicated to improving the mental and physical condition of its mem-
bers, was indicted under a statute making it unlawful "for any body
of men whatever, other than the regular organized volunteer militia
of [Illinois], and the troops of the United States, to associate themselves
together as a military company or organization . *.".. 56 The indict-
ment charged that Presser, armed with a cavalry sword, had marched
through the streets of Chicago, leading some four hundred armed fol-
lowers on horseback. The Court observed that "[m]ilitary organiza-
tion and military drill and parade under arms are subjects especially
under the control of the government . . . ."
To summarize, it appears from Supreme Court decisions that
states may not interfere with or discourage group exercise of first
amendment rights without a compelling state interest. At the same
time, such an interest or sufficient justification for interference with
association itself will be found more easily where particular kinds of
groups are involved. State action that discourages membership in, or
exercise of first amendment rights through, such groups is not invalid
under the Constitution. Moreover, states may regulate group activities
50 Act of Sept. 23, 1950, ch. 1024, tit. I, § 7(d) (4), 64 Stat. 994 (repealed 1968).
Title I, § 3 (3) defined "Communist-action organization" as:
(a) any organization in the United States . . . which (i) is substantially
directed, dominated, or controlled by the foreign government or foreign
organization controlling the world Communist movement . . . and (ii) oper-
ates primarily to advance the objectives of such world Communist movement
; and
(b) any section, branch, fraction, or cell of any organization defined in
subparagraph (a) of this paragraph which has not complied with the regis-
tration requirements of this title....
Id. §3(3), 64 Stat. 989.
5150 U.S.C. § 781(15) (1970).
52 Id. §781(4).
t3 Id. §781(15).
54116 U.S. 252 (1886).
5 5 Id. at 267.
56 Id. at 253-54.
57 Id. at 267-68.
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not within the ambit of the first amendment or some other constitutional
provision so long as the regulation is reasonably related to a legitimate
state interest.
III. CURRENT FORMS OF STATE REGULATION OF NEIGHBORHOOD
DEFENSE ORGANIZATIONS
Before analyzing existing or proposed statutes possibly applicable
to neighborhood defense organizations, consideration should be given to
the state interests that might justify such statutes.
A. Bases for Regulation
Private tort actions will be available both as a remedy for, and a
deterrent to, excessive behavior by neighborhood defense organizations
and their individual members."' But a state legislature can reasonably
conclude that such an after-the-fact remedy will be insufficient because
of the serious dangers inherent in the presence of an organized, armed
group on the public streets. This same danger is present to a lesser
extent when the group is unarmed. At the same time, some groups and
individuals actually may be judgment-proof. This possibility in itself
is sufficient justification for the state to establish some bonding and
licensing requirements. 9
The state may justify additional regulation, and possibly even pro-
hibition, on the grounds that the effective operation of the public police
requires that it have the exclusive responsibility for law enforcement.
Various aspects of this rationale are discussed in cases dealing with the
Pennsylvania Private Detective Act which established licensing require-
ments for detective, guard, patrol, and similar businesses.60 In an early
case, the court recognized that the granting of a license for detective
work "would interfere with the due administration of justice and with
the duties of the . . . police force." 61 More recent cases have expressed
similar concerns.62 The courts have indicated that they are particularly
worried that some citizens may confuse the private detectives with the
authorized police. One court explained:
Insofar as wearing uniforms is concerned, we are not to be
understood as favoring such practice. If, however, the wear-
ing of uniforms is deemed necessary to properly carry out
the services proposed to be offered to the public, such uniforms
should not in any respect be similar to those worn by any
58 See, e.g., Note, Private Police Forces: Legal Powers and Limitations, 38
U. CmI. L. REv. 555, 563-65 (1971).
59 See Buckman's Application, 14 Pa. D. & C. 611, 612 (Somerset Co. Ct. 1930).
60 PA. STAT. ANt. tit. 22, §§ 11-30 (1955); see text accompanying notes 70-77
injra.
61 In re Armour, 1 Pa. Dist. 620 (Schuylkill Co. Ct. 1892).
62 E.g., Buckman's Application, 14 Pa. D. & C. 611, 612 (Somerset Co. Ct. 1930).
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recognized public police force. Badges or insignia similar to
that of public policemen should never be worn.63
Apparently the court's underlying concerns with allowing private
citizens to wear uniforms similar to those worn by the police were two-
fold. Where the practice was allowed, citizens would no longer be able
to rely on a police uniform as a tacit representation of the state's ap-
proval of an actual policeman's qualifications. At the same time, the
police themselves would no longer be able to rely on their uniforms as
symbols of state authority. Although these concerns are focused on
uniforms, they would also be present to some degree where other be-
havior of private organizations might reduce the public confidence in
or reliance on the police.
The state's interest in regulation or prohibition is greatest where
weapons are used or carried by members of a neighborhood defense
group while on patrol. In Presser v. Illinois the Court stated that
"[t]he right . . . to drill or parade with arms, without, and inde-
pendent of, an act of Congress or law of the State authorizing the same
is not an attribute of national citizenship." 64 Recent court decisions
dealing with firearms registration indicate that the state and federal
governments have broad powers to limit the possession and use of
weapons." Considering the dangers inherent in armed persons patrol-
ling the streets, the state clearly has the power to prohibit such activity.
B. Existing Statutes
Each state allocates the public police function among itself and
various political subdivisions. Pennsylvania, for example, has enacted
an elaborate scheme for allocating this function.66 As with most states,67
however, it has not insisted on a governmental monopoly in this field.
Pennsylvania laws are typical examples of the types of statutes regulat-
ing persons who want to establish or participate in neighborhood defense
organizations, and will serve as the basis for this discussion.
1. Licensing and Similar Statutes
Pennsylvania retains several statutory provisions permitting pri-
vate exercise of the police function. First, the legislature has retained
an 1870 statute that authorizes "patrols or watchmen" to be "selected
63 In re Licensed Detectives, 60 Pa. D. & C. 544, 546 (Berks Co. Ct. 1947).
64 116 U.S. 252, 267 (1886).
65 See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939); Cases v. United
States, 131 F.2d 916 (1st Cir. 1942); United States v. Tot, 131 F.2d 261 (3d Cir.
1942), rev'd on other grounds, 319 U.S. 463 (1943) ; Burton v. Sills, 53 N.J. 86, 248
A2d 521, appeal dismissed, 394 U.S. 812 (1969).
66 See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 12,231-36, 22,531-40 (1955).
67 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 15:4-1, 45:19-9 (1939); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN.
ch. 147, §22 (1965).
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and employed by and at the private expense of the residents or of those
doing business" in a neighborhood of Philadelphia.68 These watchmen
must be appointed and commissioned by the mayor, and they have all
the powers of ordinary policemen. 9 Secondly, the Private Detective
Act of 1953 70 provides for the licensing of those who engage in the
"private detective business, the business of investigator, the business of
watch, guard, or patrol agency .... ," 71
Both statutes recognize the need for strict regulation or control of
these types of organizations, even when, as with those licensed under
the Private Detective Act, no powers of arrest are granted beyond those
of the ordinary citizen. 2 While there are other obvious justifications,
state regulation of these types of organizations is justified as a legiti-
mate exercise of the state's authority to regulate business in the public
interest.7" Neither statute would apply to self-sufficient neighborhood
defense groups since such groups are not "employed" and are not "busi-
nesses." It is less clear whether the statutes would apply to groups that
receive some financial support from non-participating community resi-
dents who are not doing business in the area. The 1953 Act defines pri-
vate detective business as a type of activity done "for any consideration
whatsoever . . . . " This language can be broadly construed to in-
clude groups such as CHAIN and the NWCC which accept contribu-
tions to help defray equipment and other expenses. This construction
is not an unreasonable one in light of the Act's provision that persons
who perform the particular activities "shall be presumed to do so for a
fee, compensation, or reward." "
The 1953 Act not only establishes licensing provisions but also
authorizes district attorneys to prosecute violations as misdemeanors. 6
The standards set for the granting of a license are high,77 and may be
impossible for most members of neighborhood defense organizations to
66 PA. STAT. AN. tit. 53, § 17,096 (1957) ; cf. id. § 12,236.
69 Id. § 17,096.
70 Id. tit. 22, §8 11-30 (1955).
71 Id. § 12. That the role of the private detective overlaps that of the police can
be seen from an examination of some of the provisions of the Private Detective Act,
particularly PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 12(b) (1), (6), (10), (11) (1955).
72 See License of Niehoff, 9 Pa. D. & C.2d 410, 413 (Berks Co. Ct. 1956);
It re Licensed Detectives, 60 Pa. D. & C. 544, 545-46 (Berks Co. Ct. 1947).
73 See, eg., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
74 PA. STAT. AxN. tit. 22, § 12(b); see MASS. GEN. LAws A N. ch. 147, § 22
(1965) ("for hire, fee, reward or other consideration ... .
75 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §28 (1955).
76 Id. §§ 26-27.
77 Section 16 of the Private Detective Act provides that before a license is issued
the Court of Quarter Sessions must be satisfied of the "good character, competency
and integrity" of an applicant. Proper inquiry into the "competency and integrity" of
an applicant for a detective license requires the court to examine whether the applicant
is a person "experienced in essentials of the business he proposes to engage in,
acquainted with the methods and habits of criminals, familiar with the privileges and
duties of officers charged with their pursuit and arrest, possessed of the requisite
courage, moderation, coolness and integrity to act judiciously and efficiently in trying
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meet. Thus, if these members of neighborhood defense organizations
are found to be within the concern of the Private Detective Act when-
ever their group receives some form of financial support, many neigh-
borhood defense organizations may be effectively proscribed.
2. False Personation Statutes
In addition to the authorization and licensing statutes, Pennsyl-
vania has three separate personation statutes.7 The application of
these statutes to neighborhood defense organizations will not depend on
a finding that the group is carrying on a business. Two of these statutes
make it a misdemeanor to falsely "personate, by uniform, insignia or
otherwise, any [police officer]." "9 The third statute, and the one which
will be discussed in this section, has a broader scope:
Whoever falsely represents himself to be or falsely
assumes to act as a detective or any elective or appointive
officer of the Commonwealth, or of any political subdivision
thereof, is guilty of a misdemeanor .... ..
This statute has been construed not to require proof of fraudulent
intent before punishment can be imposed.8' Moreover, it appears from
the statutory language that there is no requirement that other citizens
must have believed the defendant to be acting in an official capacity.
The mere act of falsely assuming to act as an officer is punishable by
itself.
There are no reported cases where prosecutions have been
brought under this statute against members of neighborhood defense
organizations. In future prosecutions against these members, the de-
fendant perhaps will not have intended to impersonate a police officer,
but he will, or should, have been aware that his actions were those of a
policeman, and that citizens were likely to believe that he was a police-
man. Under such circumstances, the statute probably will be applicable
although the same court which declared that no fraudulent intent was
required also stated that the statute would not punish acts "innocently
done." 82 In the case cited by the court for this latter proposition, the
situations." In re Cameron's License, 25 Pa. D. & C. 917, 919 (Phila. Co. Ct. 1916)
(construing Act of May 23, 1887, Pub. L. No. 173, which was the precursor of the
Private Detective Act of 1953).
78 See notes 79-80 infra.
79 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 12,235 (1957) (cities of the first class) ; id. § 22,534
(cities of the second class).
80 Id. tit. 18, § 4319.
81 Commonwealth v. Lorey, 25 Beaver Co. L.. 5 (Pa. C.P. 1963) ; cf. Corn-
monwvealth v. Brewer, 109 Pa. Super. 429, 433-34, 167 A. 386, 387-88 (1933)
(reversing conviction because defendant had made no affirmative acts that would
indicate he was a policeman).
82 Commonwealth v. Lorey, 25 Beaver Co. L.J. 5, 6 (Pa. C.P. 1963) (citing
Commonwealth v. Kline, 24 Luz. Co. L.J. 163 (Pa. C.P. 1926)).
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defendant had acted in a legitimate and reasonable belief that the
magistrate had been within his powers in authorizing the defendant to
perform the acts in question.8 3  The position of neighborhood defense
organization members is quite different in that they know, or should
know, that they have no official status.
This statute is broader than the other personation statutes in that
its coverage is not limited to false personation of policemen. The
neighborhood watchmen and patrols appointed by the Mayor of Phila-
delphia are appointed officers of a political subdivision within the mean-
ing of the statute."4 Therefore, neighborhood defense group members
who patrol streets may violate the statute by "falsely assum [ing] to act"
in that capacity. The statute also prohibits "falsely assum[ing] to
act" as a "detective." 85 Both the statutory language, and the history
of the Act, 6 leave little doubt that "detective" refers to the licensed
private detectives discussed previously,"' rather than to police depart-
ment detectives. In view of the Private Detective Act's broad definition
of "detective," 88 members of neighborhood defense organizations will
often "act as a detective" within the meaning of the personation statute.
Even where group members may not violate the Private Detective Act
itself because they are not carrying on a business, " they may be subject
to prosecution under the personation statute where they conduct
activities similar to those of a detective.
C. Statutes Dealing With Paramilitary Organizations
Although generally aimed at a somewhat different target than
neighborhood defense organizations,9" statutes restraining paramilitary
organizations have been thought to apply to neighborhood defense
organizations. In 1966, New Jersey enacted the Paramilitary Organi-
zation Act providing that "[a] ny 2 or more persons who assemble as a
military organization for the purpose of practicing with weapons are
disorderly persons." "' The statute defines a paramilitary organization
as an organization "which engages in instruction or training in guerilla
war or sabotage." 2 Some observers have expressed the belief that the
statute was designed to give police and city officials a means to deal with
83 Commonwealth v. Kline, 24 Luz. Co. L.J. 163 (Pa. C.P. 1926).
84 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 17,096 (1957).
85 "[A]ct as a detective or any elective or appointive officer . . . . " Id. tit. 18,
§ 4319 (emphasis added).
86 The precursor to §4319, the Act of May 5, 1897, Pub. L. No. 39, § 1, was
enacted at a time when a statutory scheme for the licensing of private detectives was
already in existence. See Act of May 23, 1887, Pub. L. No. 173.
87 Text accompanying notes 70-77 supra.
88 See notes 71, 74 supra & accompanying text.
89 See note 71 supra & accompanying text.
90 See Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886), discussed at text accompanying
notes 54-57 supra.
91 NJ. STAT. ANN. §2A:170-25.14 (1971).
92 Id. § 2A :170-25.15.
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groups such as the NWCC which at the time were proliferating in
New Jersey. 3  If this is correct, the statute was clearly deficient due
to the difficulties which would be involved in proving that the NWCC
was engaging "in instruction or training in guerilla warfare or
sabotage." " Whatever its intent, the statute has not been applied to
neighborhood groups.
Attempts have been made, however, to expand the Paramilitary
Organization Act in order to deal with neighborhood defense groups.
Identical bills were introduced into the state legislature in 1968 " and
1969.96 On both occasions the bill was passed by the state senate but
was never discharged from committee in the general assembly.97  The
bill would have made it a misdemeanor for two or more persons to
"assemble as a . . . parapolice organization .... ,, s It provided
that:
"Parapolice organization" means any 2 or more persons
who knowingly exercise or attempt to exercise the powers of,
or represent or hold themselves out to be, law enforcement
officers without proper authorization for the exercise of such
powers in accordance with the provisions of law.
Proof of the commission of any of the following acts by
two or more persons acting in concert shall constitute a rebut-
table presumption that said persons are associated as a para-
police organization:
(a) the wearing of uniforms or insignia for the purpose
of identifying themselves as persons having the power to
enforce the law when they are without proper authorization
to do so;
(b) the maintenance of patrols, vehicular or otherwise,
for the purpose of stopping, searching or interrogating any
person. 9a
93 Interview with Joel Sterns, former Chief Counsel to New Jersey Governor
Richard Hughes, in Trenton, July 20, 1970.
94 Mr. Imperiale avers that the group was formed to save the nation, not to
undermine it. In addition, members of the NWCC, when engaging in firearms
training or practice, are careful to comply with state and federal gun control laws,
and use the recreational facilities of a rod and gun club. Imperiale Interview, suepra
note 14.
95 S. 783, 192d N.J. Legis. (1968).
96 S. 383, 193d N.J. Legis. (1969).
97 Legislative Index for the 1968 Session of the New Jersey Legislature, at 1624
(final ed. 1969) ; Legislative Index for the 1969 Session of the New Jersey Legislature,
at S. 12 (final ed. 1970).
98 S. 383, 193d N.J. Legis., § 2 (1969). The bill also provided:
Nothing contained herein shall be construed to abrogate or impair the
power of a private citizen to effect a common law arrest upon the commission
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This bill was designed to prohibit the activities of the NWCC,'00 which
wore uniforms and helmets and engaged in vehicular patrols.
In many ways this bill is similar in effect to the personation statute
discussed previously.1 ' One difference is that the bill seemingly
makes illegal the assembly of persons rather than focusing on their
actions. A careful analysis of the bill, however, shows that this
would not be its effect. Before individuals could be found to have
assembled as a parapolice organization there must be a finding that such
an organization exists within the bill's definition. That definition
focuses on acts: " 'Parapolice organization' means any 2 or more
persons who knowingly exercise or attempt to exercise the powers of,
or represent or hold themselves out to be, law enforcement officers
... ,, 102 Thus the bill actually would prohibit only certain types
of group activity rather than mere assembly, and thus would probably
not be subject to a compelling state interest test.
103
There are problems with this New Jersey proposal, however. It
is unclear whether the only uniforms and insignia giving rise to a
"rebuttable presumption" of the existence of a parapolice organization
are those resembling uniforms and insignia worn by the police. Fur-
thermore, it might be extremely difficult to prove that a defendant had
the intent or purpose necessary for conviction under the bill. Members
of the NWCC could claim, for example, that they wore uniforms not
"for the purpose of identifying themselves as persons having the power
to enforce the law," ' but only so that community residents who saw
them on the streets would not fear that they were criminals.
These problems were probably not responsible for the bill's failure
to be enacted. Rather, many state senators apparently feared that the
bill would have the undesirable effect of prohibiting the operation of
neighborhood defense organizations such as CHAIN. 05  Such concern
may have been unfounded since the bill excluded from its coverage
"authorized persons or agencies of this State or any of its political sub-
divisions or of the United States .... ." 106
CHAIN could be considered to have been authorized by the state's
Civil Defense Auxiliary.' ° Under the bill's operation municipalities
would be able to authorize particular neighborhood defense groups to
operate under certain guidelines, thus excluding members of that group
from the statute's application. In order to avoid charges of arbitrari-
ness, municipalities might need to establish specific conditions for
groups to meet in order to receive authorization. Given this projection,
100 Sterns Interview, supra note 93.
101 Text accompanying notes 80-89 supra.
102 S. 383, 193d N.J. Legis., §2 (1969).
103 See text accompanying notes 35-41 supra.
104 S. 383, 193d N.J. Legis., § 1(a) (1969).
105 Interview with Robert Kohler, Executive Director, Anti-Defamation League,
Newark Chapter, in Newark, July 16, 1970.
106 S. 383, 193d N.J. Legis., § 4 (1969).
107 See text accompanying note 10 supra.
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the bill becomes essentially a licensing proposal. Before proceeding to
discuss licensing, it is important to note that despite this particular bill's
failings it does represent a legislative concern with such organizations
and is the most specific attempt to deal with the problem.
D. Licensing
Licensing could provide considerable flexibility in dealing with
neighborhood defense organizations. Ideally, a licensing scheme would
be enacted by the legislature after full consideration of relevant policy
considerations rather than worked out through ad hoc exceptions al-
lowed to a prohibitory statute. There is a need for full legislative con-
sideration as to the types of defense groups which should be permitted,
the extent of their activities, and the type of governmental limitations
which would be most appropriate. One possible approach to the licens-
ing of neighborhood defense organizations will be set forth.
Licensing of neighborhood defense organizations would be consid-
ered by a three-member committee, including at least one person to be
appointed by the police commissioner. An organization applying for a
license would be required to detail its planned activities, its organiza-
tional structure, and the names of the group's officers and those mem-
bers who would be participating in patrols or other on-the-street
activities. Disclosure of the names of members who were not going to
participate actively in such activities would not be required. 08  A
license would be denied if any of the members named had recent
criminal records. Organizations applying for licenses would be re-
quired to be representative of the entire neighborhood rather than of
one particular racial, ethnic, or religious subcommunity109 Once a
license is granted, the organization would be required to submit fre-
quent reports as to changes in leadership, patrolling members, and
heterogeneity. Failure to maintain the original standards in these
regards would result in a termination of the license.
The licensing statute could establish the specific authority of all
licensees or allow the licensing committee discretion to establish limits
for each particular organization. One restriction that should be in-
cluded in the statute is a prohibition against patrol members carrying
weapons." 0
108 Cf. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), discussed at text accompanying
notes 33-37 supra.
109 Since the neighborhood involved may not be representative of the diversity of
the larger municipal population, it is also important that the defense organization is
not' in general, biased against any group which is not substantially represented in
the particular neighborhood involved. For example, the NWCC may have been
representative of Newark's North Ward, but it clearly was not representative of the
entire city. While not per se grounds for denial of a license under the statute, this
characteristic, when combined with the apparent bias of its leader and many of its
members against blacks, see note 20 supra & accompanying text, should prevent
NWCC from receiving a license.
110 See text accompanying notes 64-65 supra.
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Parapolice activities by individuals or groups not properly licensed
or in violation of a license would be a misdemeanor. Probably the most
difficult part of such a statute would be the definition of parapolice
activities. One possible approach would define parapolice activity as
patrolling the streets for the purpose of deterring or reporting crime, or
stopping or arresting those who commit criminal acts.'11 In order to
maintain its license, a neighborhood defense organization would be re-
quired to expel all members who were convicted under this or any other
statute. If a significant number of members-that number being de-
fined in advance-violated the statute or committed illegal activities
while patrolling for the organization, then the organization would have
its license revoked. In order to prevent circumvention of this provision,
an organization would not be eligible for a license if more than twenty-
five percent, or some similar figure, of its members, or any of its officers,




Generally the civil rights laws enacted by Congress since the close
of the Civil War do not reach private action." 2 ]But in recent cases, the
Supreme Court has been identifying circumstances where the more con-
ventional forms of state participation may not be required 11 or where
purely private action may result in criminal or civil liability." 4 Certain
of the civil rights acts, specifically section 241 of 18 U.S.C.," 5 and
section 1985 (3) of 42 U.S.C." 6 may be applicable to the activities of
the neighborhood defense groups, at least where these groups interfere
with federal rights.
1. Criminal Penalties Under Section 241
Section 241 of the Criminal Code, originally part of the Enforce-
ment Act of 18 7 0 ,1'7 provides for criminal penalties of up to ten years
imprisonment and a $10,000 fine:
311 Cf. S. 383, 193d N.J. Legis., § 1 (1969), quoted at text accompanying note 99
supra.
1 2 See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
113 See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970) ; Amalgamated Food
Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968). But see Lloyd Corp.
v. Tanner, 92 S. Ct. 2219 (1972); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 92 S. Ct. 1965
(1972).
"14 See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
"15 18 U.S.C. §241 (1970).
11642 U.S.C. §1985(3) (1970).
3"17 Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 6, 16 Stat. 140, 141. A complete survey of
the changes that have been made in this section since its original enactment is pro-
vided by United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70, 83 (1951) (appendix to opinion of
Frankfurter, J.).
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[I]f two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress,
threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or en-
joyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Con-
stitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having
so exercised the same .... 118
Cases under this statute have been infrequent 119 because of the reluc-
tance of the Justice Department to prosecute, °20 and uncertainty as to
the scope of the rights protected and against whom they are protected.
Section 241 does not specifically provide that defendants must have
acted willfully. In United States v. Guest,12 ' however, the Supreme
Court explained that intent must be shown in a section 241 prosecution
because the "gravamen" of the statutory offense is conspiracy.'2 2  Guest
held that to be convicted under section 241, there must be specific intent
to interfere with rights secured by the Constitution.2 3
The Guest holding regarding intent under section 241 is thrown
into some doubt by Griffin v. Breckenridge:"4 in which, subsequent to
Guest, the Court declined to infer an intent requirement from statutory
language punishing conspiracy. In Griffin, the Court denied that in-
tent to interfere with federal rights was a prerequisite to civil liability
under section 1985(3) of 42 U.S.C.' Section 1985(3) in relevant
part provides for civil liability for the same activities made subject to
criminal prosecution by section 241.126 Assuming it did not overrule
Guest regarding intent under section 241, Griffin established a signifi-
cant distinction between civil and criminal liability for interfering with
federal rights. The distinction may rest on the different problems raised
by criminal statutes.' For example, section 242 of the Criminal Code
prohibits willfully subjecting any state inhabitant "to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Con-
stitution or laws of the United States . . .28 In order to avoid
118 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1970).
1 1 9 See UNITED STATES Comm'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, REPORT: JUSTICE (Book 5)
53, 63-64 (1961) ; Note, Federal Civil Action Against Private Individuals For Crimes
Involving Civil Rights, 74 YALE L.J. 1462, 1463 (1965).
20 UNITED STATES Comm'x oN CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 119, at 63-64.
121383 U.S. 745 (1966).
1221 d. at 753-54; see id. at 760.
123 Id. at 760.
124403 U.S. 88 (1971).
1251d. at 102 & n.10.
12642 U.S.C. §1985(3) (1970).
127 See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 785 (1966) (Brennan, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961)
("Moreover, [42 U.S.C. § 1938] provides a civil remedy, while in the Screws case we
dealt with a criminal law challenged on the grounds of vagueness.").
128 18 U.S.C. §242 (1970).
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problems of vagueness, the Court has construed this statute to require
specific intent to interfdre with a recognized federal right.'29
Proving the intent necessary for criminal liability under section
241 may often be difficult where members of citizen defense groups are
involved. Members can claim a good faith belief that their actions were
necessary to protect the community.
Even when proof of intent does not pose a problem, questions will
remain as to what rights are "secured" by the Constitution and federal
laws and against whom they are secured. Many constitutional rights
are secured only against state action. United States v. Guest made
clear that where section 241 prosecutions were brought for deprivation
of these rights the indictment must allege some form of state involve-
ment in the deprivation.'3 There are, on the other hand, federal rights
guaranteed against private as well as public interference. In Guest,
the Court declared that the right to travel interstate was such a right.8 1
Where deprivation of these rights is alleged, there is no need to show
state involvement in the deprivation.
In Guest, a majority of the Court declined to hold that section 241
was applicable to purely private deprivation of the rights enumerated in
the clauses of the fourteenth amendment. Significantly, however, the
Court also declined to hold that Congress did not have the power under
the enforcement clause 132 to pass laws imposing punishment for private
deprivation of such rights. 33 Assuming Congress has and exercises this
power, there still would be a need to show some direct or indirect in-
volvement in the establishment or ownership of facilities where a private
conspiracy had prevented equal use. 3 ' But the prosecution would be
relieved of showing that there was state participation in the actual de-
privation. If streets are deemed to be state facilities, statutes punishing
private deprivation of fourteenth amendment rights would be useful in
prosecuting neighborhood defense groups. Whether Congress has
power, however, to enact such statutes remains subject to consider-
able debate. 38
129 See United States v. Screws, 325 U.S. 91, 101-07 (1945) (plurality opinion
of Justice Douglas).
130 383 U.S. at 754-56. The Court overruled the granting of a motion to dismiss
an indictment brought under § 241 because the indictment contained "an express
allegation of state involvement."
131 Id. at 759 n.17.
132 "The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,
the provisions of this article." U.S. CONst. amend. XIV, § 5.
133 In fact, six Justices in Guest agreed that Congress did have power under
the enforcement clause of the fourteenth amendment to pass laws imposing punish-
ment for private deprivation of fourteenth amendment rights. See 383 U.S. at 761-62
(Clark, J., concurring, joined by Black and Fortas, JJ.) ; id. at 781-84 (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Warren, C.J., and Douglas, J.).
134 See Note, Fourteenth Amendment Congressional Power to Legislate Against
Private Discriminations: The Guest Case, 52 CoRNELL L.Q. 586-89 (1967).
135 See notes 158-59 infra & accompanying text.
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2. Private Remedies Under Section 1985(3)
Section 1985 (3), imposing civil rather than criminal liability, goes
beyond section 241 and specifically reaches conspiracy to deprive any
person "of the equal protection of the laws." Section 1985(3)
provides:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory con-
spire or go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of
another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly or in-
directly, any person or class of persons of the equal pro-
tection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities
under the laws . . . , if one or more persons engaged therein
do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object
of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person
or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or
privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured
or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages,
occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one
or more of the conspirators.' 3
Section 1985(3) may be construed as an intended exercise of
congressional power under the enforcement clause to reach purely
private deprivation of the rights enumerated in the clauses of the four-
teenth amendment. The Court considered this question in Griffin v.
Breckenridge ... in which an action was brought under section 1985 (3)
against defendants for blocking the plaintiffs' passage on a public
highway, pulling them from their car, and beating them. 3 , Finding
that a claim had properly been stated under section 1985(3),'39 the
Court declared:
A century of Fourteenth Amendment adjudication has
made it understandably difficult to conceive of what might
constitute a deprivation of the equal protection of the laws by
private persons. Yet there is nothing inherent in the phrase
that requires the action working the deprivation to come from
the State. Indeed, failure to mention any such requisite can
be viewed as an important indication of congressional intent
to speak in § 1985(3) of all deprivations of "equal protection
of the laws" and "equal privileges and immunities under the
laws," whatever their source.'
40
Without any state action requirement, section 1985(3) could
evolve into a general federal tort law, thereby presenting significant
13642 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1970).
137403 U.S. 88 (1971).
138Id. at 89-92.
139 Id. at 102-03.
140 Id. at 97.
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constitutional questions of congressional power and the tenth amend-
ment. The Court sought to avoid this difficulty by drawing from the
language of section 1985(3) and its legislative history a requirement
that the conspiracy must be racially motivated and aimed at denying
equal enjoyment of rights secured to all:
The language requiring intent to deprive of equal protec-
tion, or equal privileges and immunities, means that there
must be some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, in-
vidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators'
action. The conspiracy, in other words, must aim at a
deprivation of the equal enjoyment of rights secured by the
law to all.' 4
The Court did not attempt to delineate the rights that were so secured.
Although clearly including only the right to travel interstate and the
right of Negroes to be free of the vestiges of slavery,142 the Court
implied that a "long list of enumerated rights such as free speech,
assembly, association, and movement" might also be included.'43 This
may indicate that these rights and others protected against govern-
mental intrusion by the first amendment or other constitutional pro-
visions, are now to extend to protect against infringement by private
conspiracies.' 44
The difficulty with such an expansive reading comes from the need
to find a source of constitutional power for Congress to translate these
limits on federal and state power into similar limits on the actions of
private individuals. In Breckenridge the Court did not attempt to find
congressional power to enact section 1985(3). It instead looked for
a source of power by which Congress could reach the particular con-
spiracy that had been alleged.145  Two sources were found: the right
of citizens to travel interstate 146 and the right of black citizens to be free
of all incidents and badges of slavery. 4 7  Reliance on these specific
rights protected by the Constitution against private as well as state
action 148 enabled the Court to avoid a square holding concerning the
scope of the fourteenth amendment's enforcement clause.'4
There are analytic difficulties in concluding that Congress' power
of enforcement-enforcement of a constitutional provision directed
1
4 1 Id. at 102.
142 Id. at 105-06.
143 Id. at 103. See also The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HIARv. L. Rtv. 38,
99 (1971).
144 See Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227, 1234-45 (8th Cir. 1971) (en banc)
(right of free exercise of religion).
145 403 U.S. at 104.
146 Id. at 105-06.
1
4 7 Id. at 104-05.
148 Id. at 104-06.
149 Id. at 107.
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against the state 5°--provides a source of power to apply it to private
individuals.' 5 ' However, in United States v. Guest 152 six Justices,
though not joining in a majority opinion, concluded that there was such
power under the fourteenth amendment enforcement clause.'53 Speak-
ing for three members of the Court, Justice Brennan stated:
[The fourteenth amendment enforcement clause] authorizes
Congress to make laws that it concludes are reasonably neces-
sary to protect a right created by and arising under that
Amendment; and Congress is thus fully empowered to deter-
mine that punishment of private conspiracies interfering with
the exercise of such a right is necessary to its full protection.' 54
This statement does not indicate that Congress can reach all con-
spiracies, but only those that interfere with an individual's rights
vis-A-vis the state. Justice Brennan stressed congressional power to
reach conspiracies that interfere with the right to equal utilization of
state facilities.'55 This analysis, if accepted, could provide a remedy
against neighborhood defense organizations that had interfered with
the equal utilization of the public streets. 5 Since the Breckenridge
decision, at least one court of appeals has relied on the fourteenth
amendment enforcement clause as a source of congressional power to
reach private conspiracies under section 1985(3).'1
7
Several considerations, however, including the failure in Guest
of the Justices to join in one opinion of the Court'5 . and the Court's
failure to resolve the question in Breckenridge despite its citation to
Guest'59 indicate that continuing doubt exists as to the scope of con-
gressional power under the enforcement clause. Until this doubt is
eliminated, section 1985 (3) will be an unreliable remedy for the excess
behavior of citizen defense groups, except when the group interferes
1 5 0 The fourteenth amendment reads: "No state shall ... " U.S. CoNsT.
amend. XIV, § 1.
151 See Feuerstein, Civil Rights Crimes and the Federal Power to Punish Private
Individuals for Interference With Federally Secured Rights, 19 VAND. L. REv. 641,
673-75 (1966).
152383 U.S. 745 (1966).
153 See note 133 supra.
154 383 U.S. at 782.
155 Id. at 784.
156 See note 134 supra & accompanying text.
1 5 Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227, 1235-37 (8th Cir. 1971) (en banc); see
Azar v. Conley, 456 F.2d 1382, 1386 n.5 (6th Cir. 1972).
'
5 8 The opinion of the Court in Guest declined to hold that § 241 was intended
to reach purely private deprivation of fourteenth amendment rights and thus did not
reach the question of Congressional power under that amendment's enforcement clause.
Justices Clark, Black, and Fortas joined in the Court's opinion but found it appro-
priate to discuss congressional power under the enforcement clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 383 U.S. at 761. Justices Brennan, Warren and Douglas agreed both
that Congress had power under the enforcement clause to reach private deprivation
of fourteenth amendment rights and that § 241 was an exercise of that power. 383
U.S. at 784-86. See notes 132-34 supra & accompanying text.
159 403 U.S. at 107 n.12.
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with the rights of blacks because of their race,6 ° or when sufficient state
action exists to find congressional power to reach the conspiracy under
the fourteenth amendment.' 6' In those situations where the neighbor-
hood defense group receives support, training, equipment, financial
assistance, or supervision 162 from some organ of state or local govern-
ment, there may be sufficient state action to reach the conspiracy. In
fact, there may be an additional civil cause of action under section 1983
of 42 U.S.C. against individual group members who interfere with
fourteenth amendment rights.1
6 3
While providing on its face for remedial relief only, section
1985(3) has been construed to allow injunctive relief. In Action v.
Gannon,"64 the Eighth Circuit, in an en banc decision, held that the
district court has jurisdiction, in appropriate cases, to provide injunc-
tive relief when the requirements of section 1985 (3) are met.' 5 Such
equitable relief could be extremely important in limiting the action of
neighborhood defense groups that have shown a propensity to, or repre-
sent a clear threat to, violate the rights of citizens under the conditions
of section 1985 (3).
B. Recently Proposed Legislation
Part of a recently proposed reformulation of the Criminal Code is
relevant to a discussion of neighborhood defense organizations. The
Final Report of the National Commission on Reform of Federal Crimi-
nal Laws recommended to Congress the addition of the following pro-
vision to 18 U.S.C.:
§ 1104. Para-Military Activities.
(1) Offense. A person is guilty of an offense if he know-
ingly engages in, or intentionally facilitates, para-military
activities not authorized by law. "Para-military activities"
means acquisition, caching, use, or training in the use, of
160 See text accompanying note 140 supra.
161 It may also be argued that the very nature of a neighborhood defense organi-
zation-a group formed out of a belief in the insufficiency of police protection-allows
§ 1985(3) to apply. At least in the view of the community, such a group is the
"functional equivalent" of the police department. Amalgamated Food Employees
Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308, 318 (1968). See also Marsh v. Alabama,
326 U.S. 501 (1946). This argument admittedly uses the phrase "functional equiva-
lent" out of context, and ignores the differences between the quasi-public property
involved in Logan Valley Plaza (shopping center) and a self-proclaimed police-type
organization. Nevertheless, where there is governmental support of a neighborhood
defense group, there is official recognition that it is performing part of the traditional
function of the police. Under these circumstances private relief under § 1985(3)
should be available. But see Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 92 S. Ct. 2219 (1972).
162 CHAIN, for example, received uniforms and equipment from civil defense
authorities. See note 10 supra & accompanying text.
163 See generally Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
164450 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1971) (en banc).
165 Id. at 1237-38.
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weapons for political purposes by or on behalf of an associ-
ation of ten or more persons. Activities authorized by law
include activities of the armed forces of the United States or
of a state, including reserves and the National Guard, and
federal, state or local law enforcement operations.' 6"
This section was designed to outlaw private armies.'67 The only com-
parable provision in existing federal law is section 2386 of 18 U.S.C.,
which establishes a registration requirement for "[e]very organization
which engages both in civilian military activity and in political ac-
tivity." "' Since no organization has ever registered under section
2386,169 there have been no administrative or judicial interpretations
of the language, and no determinations as to its constitutionality.
While it is certain that the Commission was aware of neighbor-
hood defense organizations when it proposed section 1104, the Com-
mission's intent as to the section's application to such organizations is
unclear. The Commission noted two "troublesome questions" regard-
ing proposed section 1104:
(1) does it effectively reach private armed groups whose al-
leged objective is "self-defense"?
(2) does it improperly jeopardize groups who have indeed
armed themselves for protective purposes, e.g., to patrol
neighborhoods with high rates of violent crime? 170
One might infer from the first question that the Commission had
determined that proposed section 1104 should apply to prevent the arm-
ing of neighborhood defense organizations, and was concerned with the
section's ultimate effectiveness. The import of the second question is
less clear. Perhaps the Commission was concerned that the proposed
section is too broadly worded, possibly extending to groups that the
Commission did not intend to outlaw. Or perhaps the Commission did
intend to reach even those groups with genuinely "protective purposes"
but was unsure of the wisdom of doing so.
On its face the proposed statute would apply to a neighborhood
defense organization that carried weapons, if it meets the "political
activity" requirement. Although the proposed statute does not attempt
to define this phrase, the existing section 2386 defines it as
1 6 6 NAT'L COMm'N ON REFOR OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWs, FINAL REPORT:
A PROPOSED NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE § 1104, at 80-81 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as PROPOSED CRIMINAL CODE).
167Id. 81. The Commission characterized the proposed § 1104, "as a provision
whose frequent use is not contemplated and where successful prosecution is not
likely but which can serve as an aid to discourage participation in this type of activity."
1 NAT'L COMM'N ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWs, WORxNG PAPERS 436-37
(1970) [hereinafter cited as WORKING PAPERS].
168 18 U.S.C. §2386(B) (1) (1970).
169 WORKING PAPERs, supra note 167, at 436 n.1.
170 PRoPosED CRIMINAL CODE, mtpra note 166, § 1104, at 81.
1972]
976 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
any activity the purpose or aim of which . . . is the control
by force or overthrow of the Government of the United States
or a political subdivision thereof, or any State or political
subdivision thereof.'
7 1
Under this definition each of the three example neighborhood defense
organizations would be exempt from the operation of both the existing
and proposed statutes.
The proposed section 1104 does not specifically adopt this defini-
tion, as can be seen by the Commission's expressed concern that the
use of the term "political activity" could provide excessive latitude for
administrative and judicial construction. 2  Adoption of a broad defi-
nition may also raise constitutional questions. Political expression is
guaranteed by the first and fourteenth amendments. To make criminal
liability for the "acquisition, caching, use, or training in the use, of
weapons" turn on whether the act was done for a "political (broadly
defined) purpose" is arguably unconstitutional due to its chilling ef-
fect 173 on the exercise of first amendment rights. The answer to this
argument, however, is that the fundamental antithesis between guns and
the free political discussion which is the purpose of the first amendment,
justifies the prohibition of their combination. A political group that
acquires or trains in the use of guns presents a clear threat to the secu-
rity of the state and federal governments, and can be prohibited.'74
V. GOVERNMENTAL SUPPORT
A. Value
States and municipalities faced with mounting crime rates may de-
cide not only to permit neighborhood defense groups but to support
them as well.' 75 Support could go beyond verbal encouragement and
171 18 U.S.C. §2386(A) (1970).
172 WORIING PAPERS, supra note 167, at 436.
173 See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 487 (1965).
174 See Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
175 The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of
Justice states:
In addition to taking normal precautions against crime, citizens can
mobilize to help the police and other branches of the criminal justice system.
The ancient frank pledge of medieval villagers can have its counterpart among
modem urban dwellers who complement police action in deterring, reporting,
and rehabilitating law violators.
Groups of citizens in a few communities or neighborhoods complement
police preventive patrols. For example, in Washington, D.C., several private
citizens with "ham radios" in their cars have formed a "React" program to
patrol three high crime precincts on weekends. On Friday and Saturday
nights between 8 and 12 midnight, peak hours in the city's criminal activity,
they cruise their beats in teams of two, alert to any potentially unruly teenage
gatherings or other suspicious activity. Their function is merely to transmit
information to a base station, which relays it to the police dispatcher for
appropriate police coverage or surveillance. In other cities, radio band
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advice, and include equipment, training, or education.'76 Such assistance
could be conditioned on a group's willingness to accept certain limita-
tions on its activities, thus providing an additional means of govern-
mental regulation. Conditional assistance could supplement but not
replace a regulatory or licensing scheme, however, since those groups
that pose the greatest danger are also the ones least likely to accept re-
straints in return for assistance. But groups with legitimate defense
purposes generally will be quite anxious to accept aid. Although equip-
ment costs may not be prohibitive, organizations in low and lower-
middle income neighborhoods are likely to find outside financial assist-
ance particularly valuable.
In addition, these groups are likely to desire governmental support
because of related increases in prestige, self-satisfaction, and community
support. Technical and training assistance can be particularly impor-
tant in this regard. The members of CHAIN, for example, exhibited
pride in their completion of thirty-six hours of training. 7  Members
of such groups, like most citizens, are aware that police-type activities
can present dangers both to themselves and to others. Providing mem-
bers with some physical, legal, and common-sense training will help
prevent dangerous situations from developing, and also increase the
positive protective effects of the organization. 78  Such training may
operators' clubs perform similarly, watching for stolen cars, suspicious
circumstances, runaways, and escapees.
In addition to this kind of citywide help, the residents of many neigh-
borhoods carry on their own watchdog activities, keeping an eye on absent
homeowners' property, reporting suspicious incidents and, in some cases,
making neighborhood rounds.
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 22, at 223.
The report of the Governor's Select Commission on Civil Disorders in New
Jersey, appointed by former Governor Hughes to analyze the cause of the 1967
Newark riots and to issue proposals for reform, calls for, "the experimental use of
both adult and teenage citizens as volunteer foot patrols," and even suggests pro-
viding remuneration to such patrols in high crime areas. GOVERNOR'S SELECT CoMt-
miSSION ON CiVI DISORDERS, NEW JERSEY, REPORT FOR ACTION 164 (1968); cf.
T. KNOPF, YOUTH PATROLS: AN EXPERIMENT IN COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION (1969).
176 It is unlikely that a municipal government would decide to provide salaries
to members, especially considering the budget squeeze presently faced by such govern-
ments. If sufficient funds are available for additional law enforcement salaries, it is
most likely that they will be used for additional full-time, trained policemen. Salaries
to neighborhood defense group members would almost certainly be opposed by the
police department and the policemen's union. See note 180 infra. In addition, a city
would be unlikely to risk exposing itself to possible liability for the acts of these
"employees." Moreover, federal funds which may be available for other types of
support for neighborhood defense organizations will not be available for salaries.
See 42 U.S.C. §3731(b)(7) (1970) ("[tlhe recruiting, organization, training and
education of community service officers . . . . ") ; id. § 3781 (k).
177 Weekes Interview, supra note 6; interview with several members of CHAIN,
in Newark, July 11, 1970.
178 These positive effects include increased information for police, increased
deterrence of crime, and greater citizen awareness of problems faced by police and
victims. See N.Y. Times, May 25, 1972, at 56, cols. 1-6.
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also help the citizen defense group concerned with its public image 17
to gain community trust and support.
1. Coordination
The police department could appoint one of its members to serve
as a coordinator for each neighborhood defense group. A member of
the precinct where the group operates, he could ensure the group a
direct line of communication with the police. Besides his primary role,
under certain circumstances the coordinator might also be called upon
to mediate minor disputes developing within the group. However, to
ensure that the organizations maintain their independence, it is impor-
tant that final decisions on major issues of group policy be made inter-
nally--except, of course, when the decision is contrary to the conditions
of governmental support. A coordination plan, like the other forms of
assistance, requires the active support of the police, both individually
and as an organization. Hopefully, the police will not be hostile to
coordination plans out of concern for professionalism or unionism.'8 0
A well-organized plan should gain police support because it will make
their jobs easier, and law enforcement more effective, while it will con-
tribute to community understanding of the problems faced by the police
every day.
2. Apathy
No form of assistance is likely to be able to prevent permanently
the development of apathy within a neighborhood defense organization.
To varying degrees this problem has arisen in each of the three groups.
Several members of the Watch lost interest because of their growing
doubts as to the program's success.' At one membership meeting
these doubts resulted in the development of factionalization caused by
disagreements as to the program's effectiveness.
8 2
179 Both the Watch and CHAIN contacted the local police department in the
hope of gaining its approval. Meeting of the Watch, in Philadelphia, June 18, 1970;
Weekes Interview, supra note 6.
180 This may be a major source of potential difficulty. In Philadelphia, for
example, the Jewish Community Relations Council (JCRC) proposed voluntary
neighborhood patrols in middle-class districts of the city, and paid patrols in poor
areas. Because the JCRC desired financial assistance from the Law Enforcement
Assistance Agency, approval of the program by local police officials was required.
See 42 U.S.C. § 3731(b) (7) (1970).
A spokesman for the JCRC believed that the police department's summary
rejection of the proposal may have been the result of the department's desire to
guard their position as exclusive protectors of society. The spokesman observed
that police officials had somewhat lessened their opposition to the proposal when he
suggested hiring off-duty and retired policemen as supervisors and paid patrolmen.
Interview with Albert Chernin, Executive Director, and Nathan Agran, Legal Advisor
and Assistant Director, of the JCRC Philadelphia Chapter, in Philadelphia, July 3,
1970.




Loss of members was also a problem in CHAIN and the NWCC.
Over a two year period CHAIN's membership dwindled from eighty to
twenty persons. Although some of these members left to become regu-
lar law enforcement officers, many others resigned out of general dis-
interest or because of disenchantment with the infighting that had
occurred. 8 3 Even the NWCC, which in many ways provided the most
exciting program, experienced this loss of membership following policy
disagreements.' As the novelty wears off, these types of problems
are likely to develop in any neighborhood defense organization, and the
municipal government should not attempt to keep a program alive in
the face of apathy. Therefore, in deciding whether to expend funds for
the training or coordination of a citizen defense group, a municipality
must consider the likelihood that the group will survive for a length of
time sufficient to make the expenditure worthwhile. The size, leader-
ship, and organization of the group, plus the dedication and understand-
ing of its members are the primary criteria for making this judgment.
Also, it should be considered that the use of a local police coordinator
should decrease the probability of destructive apathy since open lines of
communication between the group and the police will insure that mem-
bers are kept aware of the value of their activity. Such communication
must not lessen, as it did with CHAIN,"8 5 after the initial organization
and training is completed.
B. Funding
Decisions as to municipal support of neighborhood defense groups
cannot be made without consideration of other potential uses for the
available funds, both in crime control and other governmental services.
Similarly, it must be determined whether it is a proper allocation of
law-enforcement resources for one policeman to give up part of his
normal duties in order to serve as a liaison with a citizen defense group.
In balancing the value of such expenditures of money and time, one
consideration is the availability of federal funds to help defray the costs
of particular programs.
Title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968 1" established the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
(LEAA) within the Department of Justice."' Through this agency
block grants are provided to state and municipal governments for the
establishment of programs intended to improve existing law enforce-
183 Weekes, Barnes, and Murray Interviews, supra note 6.
184 Interview with Ron Perambo, journalist and author, in Newark, July 9,
1970; see Porambo, What Really Happened With LeRoi Jones in Newark, THE
REALIsT, Sept. 1968, at 5-14.
185 Text following note 10 supra.
186 42 U.S.C. §§ 3701-95 (1970).
187 Id. §3711.
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ment 188 and for training and research in new methods of crime preven-
tion. 8 Eighty-five percent of the funds appropriated for law enforce-
ment grants go to the state governments,' for which a prerequisite is
the filing of a comprehensive state law enforcement plan.' Most of
these funds are required to be channeled by the state to local govern-
ments.' 2 In addition, the remaining fifteen percent of LEAA funds
may be allocated at the discretion of the agency directly to municipal
governments,' 9 regardless of the existence of a state plan.'9  These
discretionary grants are often reserved for local governments demon-
strating a desire to set up innovative and experimental crime-fighting
programs. 5 In deciding whether to provide some form of assistance
to community defense groups a municipality will naturally consider the
possibility that up to seventy-five percent of the governmental outlay
could be provided by the LEAA.
The LEAA can authorize financial assistance for nine general
categories of programs. Two are relevant here. Section 3731(b) (1)
provides for grants for:
Public protection, including the development, demon-
stration, evaluation, implementation, and purchase of methods,
devices, facilities, and equipment designed to improve and
strengthen law enforcement and reduce crime in public and
private places.9 6
Since this section does not limit the potential users of such equipment
and facilities, it could be used to provide some of the needs of neighbor-
hood defense groups. Groups that the local government will desire to
support will be the ones that are attempting "to improve and strengthen





19 1 1d. §§3732-33.
192Id. §3733(2). These disbursements are conditioned on the local proposal's
"conformance with any existing statewide comprehensive law enforcement plan . .. .
Id. § 3734.
19 3 Id. § 3736(a) (2).
194 Id. This subsection provides that discretionary grants must be made "accord-
ing to the criteria and on the terms and conditions the Administration determines
consistent with this chapter." These terms and conditions need not, however, include
the requirement of a statewide comprehensive plan. The conclusion that this sub-
section does not incorporate the same requirements for grants to states is based both
on the vagueness of the language and on a later sentence of § 3736 (a) (2) which
states that the compensation-of-personnel limitation applicable to grants to states,
applies to discretionary grants as well. This language would have been unnecessary,
if the "consistent with this chapter" language incorporated specific limitations on
state grants into the discretionary grant section. It should, however, be noted that
where a state comprehensive plan exists, the local grant must be consistent with it.
See note 191 supra & accompanying text.
195 Interview with Betty Schemmer, Project Advisor for the LEAA Philadelphia
office, in Philadelphia, Aug. 5, 1970.
19642 U.S.C. §3731(b) (1) (1970).
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In addition, section 3731 (b) (7) authorizes the LEAA to allocate
financial assistance for:
The recruiting, organization, training and education of
community service officers to serve with and assist local and
State law enforcement agencies in the discharge of their duties
through such activities as recruiting; improvement of police-
community relations and grievance resolution mechanisms;
community patrol activities; encouragement of neighborhood
participation in crime prevention and public safety efforts;
and other activities designed to improve police capabilities,
public safety and the objectives of this section: Provided,
That in no case shall a grant be made under this sub-
category without the approval of the local government or
local law enforcement agency.
9
Under this section grants could be made that would cover part of the
cost of both training the police officer who is to serve as the coordinator
and training the actual members of the neighborhood defense groups.
The section does not, however, provide for grants to cover part of the
continuing salary of the policeman who serves as coordinator. 9 " Any
grant under this section will require the approval of the police depart-
ment. This will not pose any additional problem, however, since the
successful operation of any local government support of a neighborhood
defense group will require, regardless of the source of funds, the active
support, as well as approval, of the police.'99
A second source of federal financial assistance to neighborhood
defense groups is the civil defense program. Under the Federal Civil
Defense Act of 1950 200 each state adopting an approved civil defense
plan may receive financial assistance for a portion of personnel and
administrative expenses.2 'O In at least one state, New Jersey, the
approved plan provides for the appointment of citizen auxiliary
police.202  CHAIN received training from the state civil defense au-
thorities under this program, and was integrated into the auxiliary
police. Although the status of any continuing obligations by members
of CHAIN in a civil defense emergency is unclear, this type of program
can provide states and municipalities with financial assistance to par-
tially offset training costs for neighborhood defense organizations.
197 Id. § 3731 (b) (7).
' 98 See id.
199 See text accompanying note 180 supra.
200 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 2251-97 (1970).
201 Id. § 2286. Federal funds cannot, however, be used for "personal equipment"
under this statute. Id. §2281 (i).
2 0 2 DivisioN OF CivnL DEFFNSE & DISASTER CONTROL, NEW JERSEY DEP'T OF
DEFENSE, AuxiLIARY POLICE PLAN: ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING (1967).
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VI. CONCLUSION
At a time of increasing public concern with rising crime rates,
neighborhood defense organizations pose an enigma. At one extreme
they can represent a positive force whereby residents of a community
can help the police make their community a safer place. But at the
same time, they can easily lead to an increase in violence and crime and
to further disrespect for society's laws. The solution to this problem,
like most others, will not come from ignoring it. Nor can society rely
on mechanisms originated to deal with other problems to be sufficient to
deal with this one. Civil rights statutes, tort remedies, private de-
tective statutes, and paramilitary acts may at times be useful in ensuring
that neighborhood defense organizations are limited to their proper
roles, but they are insufficient. They do not always successfully deter
injurious behavior, and at the same time they may prohibit useful
activities. The legislature must deal directly with neighborhood de-
fense organizations. It may decide that all activity going beyond that
of the Watch should be prohibited. Or it can decide, as is the position
of this Comment, that some such organizations can play an important
role in society's battles against crime, and that such groups should not
only be licensed and regulated, but also encouraged and at times par-
tially supported.
